Evidence of co-production in public service provision: the case of the administrative arbitration centre in Portugal by Silvestre, Hugo Consciência et al.
AC
e
o
d
w
a
s
©
P
K
R
A
d
g
o
E
S
0
bAvailable  online  at  www.sciencedirect.com
Revista de Administração
http://rausp.usp.br/Revista de Administração 51 (2016) 355–365
Environmental management
Evidence of co-production in public service provision: the case of the
administrative arbitration centre in Portugal
Evidências da coproduc¸ão na prestac¸ão de servic¸os públicos: o caso do centro de arbitragem
administrativa em Portugal
Evidencias de la coproducción en la prestación de servicios públicos: el caso del Centro de
Arbitraje Administrativo en Portugal
Hugo Consciência Silvestre a,∗, João Ricardo Catarino b, Joaquim Filipe Ferraz Esteves de Araújo c
a Universidade da Integrac¸ão Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira, Núcleo de Políticas e Administrac¸ão Pública, CE, Brazil
b Universidade de Lisboa, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas, Centro de Administrac¸ão e Políticas Públicas, Lisboa, Portugal
c Universidade do Minho, Centro de Investigac¸ão em Ciência Política, Braga, Portugal
Received 31 May 2015; accepted 9 May 2016
bstract
o-production includes all actions where citizens assist, as volunteers, in the provision of services by public agencies in order to increase the
fficiency and efficacy of the public services provided. This practice, known as co-production, is being adopted by governments in the resolution
f conflicts, particularly those regarding administrative and fiscal matters. However, is  co-production  a  more  efﬁcient  and  effective  way  of  settling
isputes  in  administrative  and  tax  areas  than  the  traditional  administrative  model?  And  why?  In Portugal, the Administrative Arbitration Centre
as created in 2009 with the aim of resolving disputes between public administration and taxpayers/service users by means of co-production. The
vailable data support the thesis that efficiency and efficacy are higher under the co-production model. Nevertheless, users are not totally satisfied
ince the costs associated with the use of this service provision model are also higher.
 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
ublished by Elsevier Editora Ltda. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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esumo
 coproduc¸ão compreende todas as ac¸ões em que os cidadãos auxiliam, numa base voluntária, a prestac¸ão de servic¸os pelas agências públicas
estados. Esta prática, denominada coproduc¸ão, é um modelo que muitos
m matéria administrativa e fiscal. Mas será a  coproduc¸ão,  comparada  com
de  resoluc¸ão  de  litígios  no  campo  administrativo  e  tributário?  E  por  quê?
09, com o intuito de resolver os litígios entre a Administrac¸ão Pública noe modo a melhorar a eficiência e eficácia dos servic¸os públicos pr
overnos estão a adotar para a resoluc¸ão de conflitos, nomeadamente e
 modelo  administrativo  tradicional,  um  modo  mais  eﬁciente  e  eﬁcaz  
m Portugal foi criado o Centro de Arbitragem Administrativa, em 20Peer Review under the responsibility of Departamento de Administrac¸ão, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸ão e Contabilidade da Universidade de
ão Paulo – FEA/USP.
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campo administrativo e tributário e os seus utilizadores, numa lógica de coproduc¸ão. Os dados disponíveis suportam a tese de que a eficiência e
eficácia são maiores sob a lógica da coproduc¸ão. Contudo, os usuários não estão totalmente satisfeitos devido aos custos associados à utilizac¸ão
deste modelo de prestac¸ão de servic¸os.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este e´ um artigo Open Access sob uma licenc¸a CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Palavras-chave: Coproduc¸ão; Servic¸os públicos; Eficiência; Eficácia; Portugal
Resumen
La coproducción comprende todas las acciones en las que los ciudadanos ayudan de forma voluntaria a los organismos públicos con el fin de
mejorar la eficiencia y la eficacia de la prestación de servicios públicos. Esta práctica es una alternativa que muchos gobiernos están adoptando
para solucionar conflictos en ámbito administrativo y fiscal. ¿Pero será la coproducción, en comparación con el modelo tradicional, una alternativa
más eficiente y eficaz para resolver dichos conflictos? ¿Y por qué? En Portugal se creó el Centro de Arbitraje Administrativo en 2009, con el fin
de resolver los conflictos entre la Administración Pública y los usuarios de sus servicios, en las esferas administrativa y tributaria, a partir de una
lógica de coproducción. Los datos analizados refuerzan la opinión de que la eficiencia y la eficacia son mayores en una lógica de coproducción.
Sin embargo, los usuarios no están plenamente satisfechos respecto a los costos relacionados con el uso de este modelo de prestación de servicios.
© 2016 Departamento de Administrac¸a˜o, Faculdade de Economia, Administrac¸a˜o e Contabilidade da Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo – FEA/USP.
Publicado por Elsevier Editora Ltda. Este es un artı´culo Open Access bajo la licencia CC BY (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The engagement of citizens in the production of public ser-
ices has recently become an important topic in the study of
ublic policy and public management (Eijk & Steen, 2014). This
ngagement has taken on the concept of co-production, which
ere we assume to be all actions  in  which  citizens  assist  public
gencies on  a voluntary  basis  in  order  to  improve  public  service
rovision  (ibid, p. 2). These actions on the part of the citizens
nclude any contribution in terms of time, effort and informa-
ion to provide public services or produce goods (Alford, 2009).
he term co-production first appeared in the work of Oström
nd her colleagues in the 1970s. This concept was first used
o describe the possible relationship between those who deliver
ervices (civil servants) and the users of these services. These
sers thus contributed their knowledge to improve the services
hey used. In this sequence, “by co-production, (.  . .) (we mean)
he process through which inputs used to produce a good or
ervice are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same
rganization” (Oström, 1996, p. 1073).
The current situation results after the influence of New Public
anagement which promoted privatization and contracting of
ublic services to the private sector (Silvestre, 2010). Although
here are several criticisms of this movement, its ideas still find
 lot of support nowadays among the governments of various
ountries and their defenders (Joshi & Moore, 2004). Originally,
his approach promoted power in professional management;
he use of explicit measures of performance; greater emphasis
n controlling the product; the breakdown of units; increased
ompetition; emphasis on management styles practiced by the
rivate sector; and greater discipline and parsimony in the use
f inputs (Hood, 1991). What is certain, however, is that no one
nows specifically which organizational arrangements are best
uited to providing high-quality, efficiently devised public ser-
ices whose results can be substantiated (Alford & O’Flynn,
g
b
t012; Hodge, 2000). In general it can be stated that “the general
elief of the experts is that most countries are agnostic” (Joshi
 Moore, 2004, p. 31) regarding the rights and wrongs of this
pproach.
The approach proposed earlier was based on the susceptibil-
ty of choice of service users who, by their action in selecting
hich goods and services they would like to use, would increase
ompetition among public organizations operating in the same
ector of activity (Araújo, 2013). With greater competition, one
ould then make better use of scarce public resources and thereby
educe organizations’ costs while increasing services quality. At
he same time, there would be even more effectiveness when
sers evaluated the performance and measured the quality of
rganizations that provide public service. These organizations
ould theoretically be committed to a comprehensive reform
oth in terms of their structure and of their culture, as is the
ase in the private sector (Jung, 2010) where customer satisfac-
ion is paramount. Citizen thus became citizen-consumers, or
lients, exercising their choice in the consumer society (Clarke,
ewman, Smith, Vidler, & Westmarland, 2007).
One of the major criticisms of New Public Management
oncerns its theoretical basis, i.e., it is badly defined and built
Araújo, 2004). According to Radnor and Osborne (2013) the
ovement’s theoretical influence was based on the experience
f a generic management theory whose contributions essentially
esulted from the experiences of the private sector and whose
ctivity, in turn, was placed at the manufacturing level, where
he product was considered crucial (Radnor & Osborne, 2013).
ccording to the authors, public services deal primarily with ser-
ices rather than products, so the theoretical support employed
n public sector reform is, under this theoretical perspective,
oorly considered. They also clam that while products are tan-
ible, services are intangible; hence the observed inconsistency,
ecause the main judges of services should be their users not
hose who produce them.
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This inconsistency can be seen in the reform proposed, which
alued issues related to efficiency and effectiveness, because a
eduction in public spending was required (Osborne, 2013). This
ccurred through the use of tools and models originating from
he private sector, such as the LEAN model, Six Sigma, Process
eengineering and Total Quality Management. Although the
ocus of these models and tools tends to promote the service user
s a key part of the organization’s action, in reality they were
verlooked in providing those services. Thus, instead of listening
o users, this reform gave priority to the evaluations of the civil
ervants in the operational base – those who directly provide
hose services to users – and with achieving the goals decided
pon by their superiors (Radnor & Osborne, 2013). In the end,
he emphasis was on the mode of operation of existing public
rganizations and on trying to change the way they operated
nternally, rather than on the intention and necessity of meeting
he real needs of their users.
To rectify the theoretical deficiencies identified in the pub-
ic management model proposed by New Public Management,
here emerged the governance model (Araújo, 2013; Osborne,
010), particularly co-production of public services as a mecha-
ism for providing those services. Co-production, as was already
entioned, has become an important topic in this area of knowl-
dge because it requires the engagement of citizens in the
rovision of public services (Eijk & Steen, 2014; Alford &
’Flynn, 2012). This approach results from the inefficiencies
f the previous model, one that did not consider user require-
ents although theoretically that premise did exist. Based on
he traditional model of public services provision, in this case
he administrative courts, we can ask the following research
uestion:
Is co-production a more efficient and effective way of settling
disputes in administrative and tax areas than the traditional
administrative model? And why?
The research question tends to connect three central concepts
n this study: co-production in regard to efficiency and effective-
ess in providing public services. The analysis will focus on a
esearch design of the case  study  type (Yin, 2009). According
o Yin (2009), case studies are very useful to analyze the reg-
larity of a particular social phenomenon. To this end, the aim
f this study, in a comparison with the traditional administrative
odel, seeks to describe and understand whether co-production
s more efficient and effective in the provision of public services
hen based on the participation of its users. In this particular
ase, this description consists in demonstrating how individual
nd collective citizens’ participation has evolved in regard to
he resolution of conflicts with the tax authority in Portugal. It
hould be noted that this study focuses on the Administrative
rbitration Centre that was created in Portugal in 2009 with the
im of resolving tax-related disputes between the Portuguese
overnment and users of the services. This option is justified by
he lack of studies of similar cases. After a description of the phe-
omenon, we will seek to understand the reasons that explain
he relationship between the concepts now under analysis, by
eans of a survey among the arbitrators of the abovementioned
rbitration centre.
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This paper starts by presenting the framework of co-
roduction, namely the conceptual characterization of this
pproach. Next, the methodology seeks to define the choices
f the research. Then we will show the results and discussed
hem based on the approach that is used, concluding the paper
ith a final reflection.
o-production  of  public  services
As mentioned above, the concept of co-production used in
his study is one that considers all actions in which in which
itizens assist public agencies on a voluntary basis in order to
mprove public service provision (Eijk & Steen, 2014). The col-
aboration of citizens in providing public services has existed
or many decades in the public sector (Bovaird, 2007). Accord-
ng to Pestoff, Osborne, and Brandsen (2006), the term refers
o a citizen’s participation in the production of public services,
here that participation is delimited. Although the authors do not
ention it, co-production has commonly begun to be used in the
roduction and provision of services by private organizations.
Unlike public organizations, private organizations have for a
ong time kept up a long-standing “a relationship of exchange
hat is affordable, voluntary and direct” with the users of their
ervices because users are not obliged to in fact purchase those
ervices (Jung, 2010, p. 442). This relationship is based on the
nterests of consumers who, in turn, are willing to demand more
nd better conditions from their service providers (Hilton &
ughes, 2013). According to Hilton and Hughes (2013) these
equirements stem from consumers’ needs and expectations,
uch as speed, convenience and affordability when providing
he service, as in the case of automatic payment at supermar-
ets, self-service cheek-in when boarding aeroplanes (Hilton
 Hughes, 2013) or banking operations online or at ATMs.
he authors would like to note that in these cases, such prac-
ices depend on two requirements in particular: on consumers’
emand for better services and at the same time being willing
o use new technology, for example; and also on their ability
o acquire the equipment necessary to access these services –
onsidering here the services that require information technol-
gy (IT). At the end of the process, customers who use IT will
ecome partial collaborators because they help private organiza-
ions to improve their services based on the former’s experience.
here is, however, one aspect that stands out from these exper-
ments: the provision of services is regular and occurs through
 supplier-service professional relationship (whatever the sec-
or may be), where all parties contribute with their resources
Bovaird, 2007).
The provision of public services is not exclusive to public
dministration. There could be countless combinations of forms
f service provision that were especially developed in recent
ecades (see Savas, 2000). Whichever combination is analyzed
t is common to identify numerous actors, apart from public
uthorities, engaged in providing such services, especially the
engagement of service users as co-producers of the services
hey receive” (Pestoff et al., 2006, p. 592) who in different
ays (collaborating in the production process, offering their
ime and/or information) contribute to the provision of a public
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ervice or the production of a good. According to the authors, the
eason for this lies in the need to consider the users of public ser-
ices as a fundamental element. This happens because they will
e the ones who define what they want to use, as well as the qual-
ty of what they are provided with. Without their consultation
r engagement, it is difficult to consolidate this. For example,
n the case of health services the collaboration and participation
f the patient throughout the process is critical to the success
f medical procedures. The same goes for recycling of house-
old waste, where the collaboration of citizens’ collaboration in
eparating waste is critical to the success of this policy.
he  co-production  of  public  services:  concept
The concept of co-production has an inaccurate and ambigu-
us meaning in the literature. The truth is that co-production
an take on various facets and moments, for instance: co-
overnance, where third-party actors participate in planning
nd providing public services; co-management, where the third-
arty actors collaborate with the State in providing public
ervices; or co-production (not in a narrow sense), which refers
o citizens’ participation in producing, at least in part, the public
ervices they will benefit from (Pestoff et al., 2006). Accord-
ng to the authors, the latter type can include services where the
elevant public authorities fund and regulate them but are not
irectly involved in providing them.
In Joshi and Moore (2004)’s view, co-production is defined
s any action that involves service users. In general, this involve-
ent is not perfectly typified, since it is carried out on an
nformal basis between users and State agencies. When this
nformality ceases to exist due to the formalization of a specific
aw, it becomes institutionalized co-production. This institution-
lized co-production in turn requires that the engagement of
sers in the provision of public services be continued between
ublic agencies and users, so it is not informal as a result of the
ong-term relationship between the parties. They also suggest
hat this does not require a contractual relationship between the
arties involved, as is claimed by the advocates of New Public
anagement. This is because contracts proscribe voluntary con-
ribution and this cannot be confused with commercial types of
rrangements such as public-private partnerships, for example.
According to Eijk and Steen (2014), the ability and will-
ngness of citizens to participate in improving the provision of
ublic services has been shown to be essential for this model
o emerge as a credible and feasible alternative, and is depend-
nt on the human and social capital of the participants. Human
apital is based on socioeconomic variables such as the level of
ducation or financial capacity of its members, while social cap-
tal depends on each member’s availability to contribute (Eijk &
teen, 2014; Joshi & Moore, 2004).
In the same sequence, Bovaird and Löffler (2013, p. 100) base
heir opinion on Governance  International  (2011), for whom
o-production aims at “the public sector’s use of the assets and
esources of users and communities to achieve better impact
nd lower costs”. According to them, the participants in the
rocess should possess some essential characteristics, namely
hat service users, thanks to the actual contact they have with
q
u
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hose services, know how to identify the features that can be
mproved; and if they are able to do so, their contribution may
elp to improve the service. If the contribution is dependent on
he willingness of users and there is no contractual basis between
he parties, the organization will benefit from this knowledge
ithout having to offer a financial reward for it. The citizen
an influence and improve the service, but also contribute to
he improvement in the quality of life of the entire community
e belongs to. Finally, the rule is broken according to which
ublic organizations should adopt a paternalistic relationship
ith the users of their services because they become participants;
artners and not just mere recipients of public services.
The position of a user of public services in this model takes
n different contours and features compared to those the former
odel. In the previous model, those who made use of the service
hould be considered ‘clients’, as is the case in the commer-
ial relationship that individuals have with private organizations,
hose main purpose is profit (Silvestre, 2010). The term ‘client’
eans that there is a direct relationship, by means of a payment,
etween those who consume a certain product or service and the
rganization that provides it; therefore, there is a direct relation-
hip with the organization’s profit (Radnor & Osborne, 2013).
ecause of their importance, ‘clients’ own the empowerment as
 result of the financial consideration involved, of selecting what
hey will make use of, having the choice reject or consume a cer-
ain good or service (Jung, 2010). Instead, citizens who are users
f public services should take a different approach because they
ay be interested the rewards arising from their participation,
he solidarity enjoyed with other members of their community,
r just the satisfaction of contributing to a cause that they feel is
ust (Eijk & Steen, 2014).
To sum up, we can assert that the engagement of public
ervice users has gradually been taking place in recent decades,
nd that lately the dynamics have be growing in this approach.
his is due to the increasing scarcity of resources, which does
ot allow them to be wasted (Eijk & Steen, 2014). To avoid this
aste, it is important that the main beneficiaries of public ser-
ices take an active part in the definition of those services. It is
lso a result of the failure of New Public Management to engage
itizens and foster their participation in public service provision
Araújo, 2013). If users can voluntarily contribute to make this
appen, it is theoretically advantageous for public authorities
ecause by gathering expertise they can improve the quality of
ervices. It will also aid in the construction of a more plural and
articipatory public administration. For these reasons, it is per-
inent to examine a specific case where such a contribution has
een given.
ethod  and  techniques  used
esearch  design  and  selection  of  the  sector
As mentioned in the introduction, and based on the research
uestion and its overall objective of study, the research design
sed will be of the case study type (Yin, 2009). According
o the author, this design is appropriate when studies are
xploratory in nature and have research questions like: What?
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e also maintains that such research design does not require
ontrol of events and focuses on contemporary occurrences, so
t should consider internal validity (through the respondents’
nderstanding of the answers they submitted) and external
alidity (whose goal is the correct connection between the tool
sed for data collection and the conceptual approach used)
Bryman, 2004). Internal validity is thus ensured since the
espondents are within the concept of co-producers as defined
y Oström (1996, p. 1073): the “contribution of subjects who do
not’ belong to the organization”. External validity was assured
oo, because the questions that respondents were asked refer to
he understanding of two distinct forms of dispute resolution
ithin the administrative and tax field – arbitration courts and
rbitration centres – regarding their efficiency and effectiveness.
n that sense, respondents do have the knowledge from the both
ypes of service provision selected for this analysis.
For the purposes of this study a specific type of co-production
as selected: co-planning and co-use, i.e., the partnership estab-
ished between organizations/subjects to create the arbitration
ourt and use that both public and private users make of it.
his option is justified by the dearth of studies on co-production
utside Anglo-Saxon countries, whose social, political and eco-
omic proportions are markedly different from other realities,
ncluding the Portuguese one. Moreover, this is an exploratory
tudy in which the analysis is performed in view of the agents
f the arbitration courts involved in providing the available
ervices. It should be noted that responding agents are real
ources of knowledge, because they are experienced users as
ell as providers of services (they are judges of the adminis-
rative courts). Thus, these agents are able to assess whether
his solution using co-production is more efficient and effective
han the traditional model of conflict resolution. Based on real
nd specialized knowledge, it is justifiable to ask them, which
s especially relevant for this study internal validation.
ata  collection  and  sources
For this exercise to be possible, the data was initially collected
rom existing documentation and files (Hood, 2011) in order to
escribe the social phenomenon that will be the aim of the study.
ccording to Yin (2009), the great advantage of these sources
re: they are stable because they can be constantly updated; they
re not obstructive since they does not result from previous case
tudies; they are accurate because they contain names, references
nd details of the social phenomenon to be asked about; and they
over a wide range of data over long time periods and various
vents. However, there are some weaknesses in the selection of
hese sources, especially because: they are difficult to access;
t is possible to select information that does not contemplate
r capture the entire reality; and possibly because much of this
nformation is not available.
For the purposes of the advantages and disadvantages in
hoosing these documentary sources, we took special care to
ccess the databases available on the Internet which include all
egal and judicial development, justification and intervention
f subjects and available data that are actually new methods of
nitiating study in this area of knowledge (see Hood, 2011). This
a
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ay, the weaknesses were cancelled out and we contemplated
 more accurate context so that the solution can be properly
tructured (Pollitt, 2010). The validity of the information is
nsured by this procedure and we essentially sought statistical
ypes of data. These data will be presented only to attest to
he evolution of the phenomenon under discussion here. Based
n the central research concepts, it was possible to access
he statistics provided by the Directorate-General for Justice
olicy (http://www.dgpj.mj.pt/sections/estatisticas-da-justica,
ast accessed on 3 April, 2016). Here we collected data that
ertain to the traditional model (Supreme Administrative
ourt, North Central Administrative Court and South Central
dministrative Court) and to Alternative Dispute Resolution
including aggregated data from Arbitration Centres, Courts of
eace and Mediation). About these, we collected data on the
fficiency rate (which translates into the number of completed
ases versus the number of new cases and cases carried forward
rom the previous year) and the average duration of completed
ases, to ascertain efficiency; and the resolution rate (if the
ndicator indicates a rate higher than 100%, this means that the
umber of completed cases is greater than the number of new
ases), to ascertain effectiveness. The data cover the 2010–2014
eriod, to enable comparison with CAAD data.
At the second stage of data collection, we used the survey
ool of self-administered questionnaires directed at the judges of
he arbitration court. According to Bryman (2004), this type of
urvey is filled in directly by the respondent. These surveys can
lso be self-administered with or without an interviewer present.
n this specific case, it was carried out without an interviewer
ecause IT (the Internet) was the vehicle used, particularly the
ending to respondents’ e-mail. A pre-test was conducted by
eans of the sending of the survey through a questionnaire to
hree judges on 5 June, 2014. The responses were received by
5 June, 2014, and these enabled us to ascertain issues related to
he advantages, disadvantages and difficulties of Administrative
rbitration Centres, their results, the participation of users and
he success factors of participation, compared to the traditional
odel.
The survey was of the structured type (Bryman, 2004). We
ook care to ask questions that covered the area of the respon-
ent’s own point of view and that can later help in the perception
f the social phenomena under study. Once the pre-test had been
arried out, 24 surveys by self-administered questionnaire were
ent on 20 June, 2014, to all judges-arbitrators of the arbitration
ourt. The anonymity of respondents was ensured, and 16 duly
ompleted surveys were received by 26 July, 2014 – a 66.7%
esponse rate. The judges were selected among agents of the co-
roduction process who were not employees or contractually
onnected to the Arbitration Centre. These are totally indepen-
ent professionals from various areas of expertise – university
rofessors specialized in taxation, former counsellor judges and
ssociate judges retired from fiscal courts (the Supreme Admin-
strative Court, for example), and taxation law consultants,
mong others – who are knowledgeable on the reality of arbitra-
ion courts in comparison with traditional administrative courts.
It should be remembered that, according to Yin (2009), one of
he advantages of using primary sources to collect data collection
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s the accuracy of the data regarding the names involved. In
his particular case the names of the arbitration centre’s judges
re identified on the centre’s website, which facilitates contact
ith them. Moreover, again according to the author, one of the
isadvantages is that it is not always possible to have access to
hem. In this specific case, the response rate is high, particularly
eeping in mind the views of people involved in the process.
here are three stakeholders in this process of creation and use
f the arbitration centre, namely public administration in the
eld of tax, taxpayers who are to some degree in dispute with
ublic administration, and also the aforementioned arbitration
udges. These judges, as will be shown below, have a duty of
ndependence, impartiality and integrity, being neither repre-
entatives nor agents of any party that appoints them. Therefore,
hey are privileged actors experiencing this social phenomenon
ecause they know the traditional model of public service pro-
ision – in this case, the fiscal courts as agents of those services
 and because they perceive the advantages and disadvantages
f this model regarding the service provided to users.
esults  and  discussion
raditional  administrative  courts  and  alternative  dispute
esolution
The Laws on Voluntary Arbitration (Law No. 31/86 of
9 August), on the General Contractual Clauses (Decree-Law
46/85 of 25 October), on Organization, Competency and Oper-
tion of Courts of Peace (Law 78/2001 of 13 September), and
n the Experimental Procedure Scheme (Decree-Law 108/2006
f 8 June), were turning points in the Portuguese legal sys-
em in regard to the modes of provision of services aimed at
lternative conflict resolution in relation to Traditional Adminis-
rative Courts. The general principle of exclusion of arbitrability
n administrative litigation was in force for centuries in the
ational legal system, as a result of the French model of pub-
ic administration. The latter is seen as a power directed at the
ursuit of public services provision. Consequently, the rule of
aw is observed, where public administration enjoys a higher
egal position than citizens (Serra, 2010). Disputes that emerged
ere usually resolved within public administration itself, with-
ut even contemplating the possibility of resorting to other forms
f provision (Catarino & Filippo, 2011).
The use of other forms of provision was not allowed on the
rounds of the general idea that public administration could not
reely have rights and public obligations at its disposal, since it
as committed to the primacy of public interest and the principle
f legality (Serra, 2010). The State could not conceptually be
resent in public relations merely as a party, but as primus  inter
ares (Catarino & Filippo, 2012).
However, the widening of the State’s functions generated
ew social rights, made public management more complex and
equired the participation of citizens in public administration. It
as only in 2004, with the reform of procedural law in adminis-
rative courts, which gradually replaced the Portuguese model of
bjectivist justice to control administrative legality by means of a
erman-rooted subjectivist model for the protection of citizens’
p
t
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ubjective rights. Arbitration, for example, among the possible
lternative dispute resolution methods, arises in tax law in a con-
ext where the intention is to avoid conflict or as an attempt to
esolve such conflicts between states and their citizens (Catarino
 Filippo, 2012).
In fact, the State is starting to become more open to ideas
f co-production in its various forms (Bovaird, 2007). Such cit-
zens’ rights have been complemented, in administrative law,
y establishing mechanisms for prior consultation. These rights
nvisage the participation of citizens in the political and admin-
strative activities of the State. This citizen engagement has
enerally been shown to be an effective and efficient means
n providing conflict resolution services. By analysing Table 1
nd considering the period between 2010 and 2014, Alternative
ispute Resolution demonstrated higher efficiency rates than
he average of traditional courts: 39.77% in 2011, 41.82% in
012, 44.67% in 2013 and 39.83% in 2014. The exception is
010, when the average efficiency rate of traditional courts was
4.65% versus 78.56% for alternative means. It can therefore
e said that alternative means are more efficient than traditional
ays of providing this service. Due to a lack of available data, the
verage duration of completed cases could not yet be analyzed.
If we consider the resolution rate, it appears that the figures
or traditional courts are as follows: 84.65% in 2010, 79% in
011, 88.37% in 2012, 112.34% in 2013 and 91.60% in 2014.
he figures presented by Alternative Dispute Resolution have
igher resolution rates in all the years considered except for
013 – see Table 1. It can thus be ended, again by comparison,
hat the effectiveness alternative dispute resolution is greater
han that of traditional means.
However, this analysis should include users’ assessments of
he service provided by alternative means. This was done by the
irectorate-General for Justice Policy (2013), which conducted
 survey with 505 users and, using a scale of 1 (very dissatisfied)
o 10 (very satisfied), ended that dispute settlement speed (aver-
ge of 7.99), cost of access (average of 7.99) and punctuality
n starting sessions when planned (average of 7.94), were the
ndicators with the lowest scores among those considered in the
nquiry. In contrast, the assessment of the work of the judges-
rbitrators, justice of the peace or mediator (average of 8.65)
nd operation of the arbitration centre, court of peace, media-
ion (average of 8.43 except, and as noted above, punctuality at
he start of sessions) were the indicators with the highest scores.
n short, alternative dispute resolution shows better rates of effi-
iency and resolution than traditional courts. There is, however,
ess user satisfaction when considering associated costs and the
peed with which cases are resolved.
he  Administrative  Arbitration  Centre
The adoption of tax arbitration in Portugal as an alternative
eans to traditional public means (the Courts) for conflict reso-
ution is based on the general idea that it is beneficial for the
ublic sector to use the resources of users and communities
o achieve the best results at a lower cost (Bovaird & Löffler,
013). The resolution of tax disputes through alternative means
as demanded in Portugal by the organizational structures of
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Table 1
Statistics on traditional courts and alternative dispute resolution.
Supreme
Administrative Court
Central Administrative
Court (North)
Central Administrative
Court (South)
Alternative Dispute
Resolution*
2010
New cases 937 1275 1996 2667
Ended cases 1038 1086 1438 2548
Pending cases 414 1555 2925 576
Efficiency rateb 71.49% 41.49% 32.96% 78.56%
Resolution ratec 110.78% 85.18% 72.04% 95.54%
Average duration of ended casesd 6 months 8 months 11 months -
2011
New cases 1088 1741 2133 2507
Ended cases 1034 1181 1705 2643
Pending cases 468 2115 3353 417
Efficiency rateb 68.84% 35.83% 33.71% 90.38%
Resolution ratec 95.04% 67.83% 79.93% 105.42%
Average duration of ended casesd 5 months 12 months 17 months –
2012
New cases 1329 1761 2242 2236
Ended cases 1192 1391 2129 2304
Pending cases 605 2485 3466 354
Efficiency rateb 66.33% 35.89% 38.05% 88.96%
Resolution ratec 89.69% 78.99% 94.96% 103.04%
Average duration of ended casesd 5 months 12 months 17 months –
2013
New cases 1692 1849 2147 2400
Ended cases 1415 1642 2412 2359
Pending cases 882 2692 3201 394
Efficiency rateb 61.60% 37.89% 42.97% 84.43%
Resolution ratec 83.63% 88.80% 112.34% 98.29%
Average duration of ended casesd 5 months 14 months 15 months –
2014
New cases 1321 1820 2072 2844
Ended cases 1297 1319 2158 2817
Pending cases 906 3193 3115 438
Efficiency rateb 58.87% 29.23% 40.94% 85.83%
Resolution ratec 98.18% 72.47% 104.20% 99.05%
Average duration of ended casesd 7 months 14 months 18 months –
Source: Own work using http://www.dgpj.mj.pt/sections/estatisticas-da-justica, consulted on 23 February 2016.
aAlternative Dispute Resolution includes cases from Arbitration Centres, Courts of Peace and Mediation Directorate-General for Justice Policy
(http://www.dgpj.mj.pt/sections/estatisticas-da-justica, last accessed on 3 April, 2016).
b Efficiency Rate = Nr. of ended cases/(Nr. pending cases at the start of the period + Nr. of new cases) × 100.
c Resolution rate = (Nr. ended cases/Nr. of new cases) × 100.
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urisdiction, regardless of res judicata.
conomic agents who opposed the monopoly of public justice
ecause it was long-winded and expensive, and did not safeguard
heir legal rights (Catarino & Filippo, 2012).
Thus, a new non-profit private jurisdiction was created in
ortugal in late 2009 – the Administrative Arbitration Centre
CAAD) – which theoretically would enable swifter resolution
f the issues that previously had to be compulsorily submit-
ed to the Fiscal Courts. This jurisdiction operates under the
egis of the Higher Council of Administrative and Fiscal Courts
CSTAF) and its founding partners are public, private and
hird-sector organizations. This model enables the connection
etween the business world and the political, social and tax
ystems, in particular with the Government and Public Admin-
stration, Associative Summits, schools and universities, and
a
i
bntry date and the date of the final decision (judgement, sentence or order) at its
he financial and business community. The law allows any
ublic or private entity to conclude association and coopera-
ion protocols with the CAAD, becoming part of its Board of
epresentatives.
Arbitration is optional, so that taxpayers can choose which
f defence channels (judicial, public, or arbitration, private)
hey wish to pursue. It is a private jurisdiction where neutral and
mpartial third parties (judge-arbitrators), chosen by the parties
r appointed by the CAAD, decide on the issues in dispute,
here decisions have the same legal value as court rulings.
he engagement of citizens in the process of selecting the
rbitrators is an innovation that allows for greater engagement
n the conflict resolution process, according to what is proposed
y co-production (Pestoff et al., 2006; Eijk & Steen, 2014).
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Table 2
Number of cases submitted to Arbitration Courts in Portugal.
Year Number of cases
2011 26 (months of September,
October, December)
2012 150
2013 311
2014 850
Total 1494
Average Duration of Ended Cases 4 months and 20 days
Source: Administrative Arbitration Centre https://issuu.com/caad.arbitragem/
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cocs/newsletter caad n1 2015?e=7377553/11811779, consulted on 22
ebruary, 2016).
Arbitration theoretically has the advantage of swiftly obtain-
ng a decision binding on the tax authorities and on the taxpayer,
imilar to decisions handed down by a fiscal court of law, as well
s ensuring, in some cases, the possibility of appeal. Since the
mplementation of arbitration as an alternative means for resolv-
ng tax disputes, it appears that the number of cases submitted
as been increasing, as can be confirmed in Table 2.
Conceptually, the political disposition for the creation of arbi-
ration in Portugal is connected to the attempt to improve the
rovision of public services both in terms of speed and of qual-
ty (Eijk & Steen, 2014; Joshi & Moore, 2004), working from
he assumption that service users have access to the necessary
esources and the will to achieved this (Bovaird & Löffler, 2013).
On this assumption, and taking into account structural and
perational processes, the CAAD is characterized by the follow-
ng (see Figueiras, 2011): the human resources centre includes
 range of specialized technicians who are responsible for all
dministrative procedures regarding the cases. Therefore, all the
teps taken are carried out by administrative human resources
ho belong to the centre. As stated above, the judges-arbitrators
re chosen from a set of personalities that are listed on the cen-
re’s website. It should be noted that these judges-arbitrators are
ot employees of the centre; they only assist in fulfilling the pur-
oses that the centre sets out to achieve. Should the parties who
se this service decide to choose a judge-arbitrator, experts, etc.,
ther than those listed by the centre, it is certain that the costs
rising from this will be borne by the parties. Despite these
ncreases, “in theoretical terms one actually see a downward
rend in arbitration costs in relation to ordinary Courts, at least
hen the parties do not appoint an arbitrator who is not part of
he Centre’s list” (Figueiras, 2011, pp. 127–128).
Given these theoretical advantages, the number of cases
esolved in that centre has been increasing. This is largely due to
he speed at which they are concluded, which is faster compared
o other courts that are considered traditional – see Tables 1 and 2.
o the time taken to resolve both administrative and tax conflicts
s on average four months and twenty days, while in other courts
hat average is higher – see Table 1. These figures prove that the
o-production is more efficient and effective than the traditional
rovision of public services, as stated in studies on co-production
Eijk & Steen, 2014; Bovaird & Löffler, 2013; Joshi & Moore,
004). However, one cannot overlook the assessment of
CAD’s services, made by its users (see Directorate-General,
i
d
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013). Referring now solely to the opinions of the CAAD’s
sers (n  = 337), it is clear that they are most satisfied with the
erformance of the judge-arbitrator responsible for their cases
an average of 8.54). However, they seem less pleased about the
wiftness of conflict resolution (an average of 7.77), the cost of
ccess (an average of 7.97), the time between the request and
he first session in which they were heard (an average of 7.79),
nd the punctuality when starting the sessions (an average
f 7.87).
According to the judges-arbitrators, the CAAD has advan-
ages over the traditional model of conflict resolution. Of the
6 interviews, all respondents mention the speed of decision-
aking as the main advantage of this model:
“We must not forget that ‘good justice is always swift justice”
(respondent 2);
“Under current circumstances, I consider that the main
advantage offered by the Centre is the gain in decision
time–compared to the saturation and the consequent slowness
of administrative and fiscal justice” (respondent 16).
According to respondents, this swiftness is due to the sim-
lification of the process (respondents 7 and 9), which does not
equire the procedural steps that take place in traditional courts
nd that generate the slowness shown in the traditional model.
n the other hand, beyond the questions of speed and proce-
ural simplicity, the choice of experts to settle disputes between
arties is also a great advantage (respondents 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12
nd 14). This is one aspect where the use of the co-production
odel in the CAAD produced great benefits. Since the judges-
rbitrators are recruited among renowned experts by means of
ngaging the parties, the average quality of decisions tends to
ncrease because they are legally based (respondent 12). More-
ver, in addition to technical quality, integrity and impartiality
n decision making are other criteria that are mentioned (respon-
ents 4 and 12). The engagement of the parties in the arbitration
rocess by choosing the judges is an important contribution to
he entire process, as is suggested in the literature (Eijk & Steen,
014; Joshi & Moore, 2004) and this can be seen here, i.e., on
verage decisions really are faster. Nonetheless, given the costs
nvolved and associated expectations, the CAAD’s users do not
ive such positive scores to the speed of processes.
Even so, these data corroborate one of the main reasons
or the creation of the CAAD, which was to swiftly obtain a
ecision that would be binding on the parties in the case. We
ould point out that co-production aims to create a possible
lternative in order to improve the provision of public services
Joshi & Moore, 2004). Thus, and according to Joshi and Moore
2004), users should participate in the design, implementation
nd evaluation of the actions and policies adopted.
Although several advantages are enumerated, some disad-
antages are also identified. According to respondents, these
isadvantages are: the continuing demand there may be for the
entre’s services and whether this will be matched by increases
n logistical and human capacity so as to maintain the current
ecision-making speed (respondents 1 and 9); and this difficulty
ecessarily means recruiting judges-arbitrators (respondent 2).
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nother of the respondents concerns is the possible lack of
mpartiality, independence and integrity of judges-arbitrators
respondents 3, 4, 11 and 12). In addition, despite the recog-
ized technical quality of decisions, the judges-arbitrators may
lso deliver poor-quality technical decisions because it can hap-
en (respondent 4). This disadvantage is associated with another
oncern – once the CAAD’s mediation is accepted by users
he decision must be accepted by the parties and this compro-
ises some individual guarantees regarding appeals against the
ecision, which are provided for in fiscal courts (respondents 7
nd 15). But if the parties are involved in the arbitration pro-
ess by appointing judges, this will foster greater acceptance of
he decisions handed down. Finally, costs are higher for users
respondents 5, 12 and 13), which partially contradicts the use
f co-production. According to Bovaird and Löffler (2013) co-
roduction aims to increase the impact of policies on citizens’
ives, particularly by lowering costs in the provision of public
ervices. We found in this case that the swiftness is real and
hat this impacts the pending issues of service users; however,
t falls short regarding the reduction of costs, which prevents
any users from resorting to this method. This is consistent
ith what is Figueiras (2001)’s claim that the costs of arbitration
hould theoretically be lower when compared to the traditional
odel. This study shows that the main reason for dissatisfaction
mong the service’s users is essentially the costs involved (see
irectorate-General, 2013).
Despite the fact that some disadvantages were identified in
omparison to the traditional model of conflict resolution, most
espondents assert that the CAAD is a model that provides
wifter results (except for respondents 7 and 11, for whom,
espectively, it is premature to make a real and reliable com-
arison, and the technical decisions do not seem to be higher in
uality). For the remaining respondents this arbitration model
rovides greater advantages than the traditional model because
here is greater agility in hiring judges (respondent 1). This
gility results from the engagement of the parties provided for by
he co-production model (Hilton & Hughes, 2013). These judges
re independent, and according to the respondent 7, demonstrate
igher productivity than the career judges of administrative
ourts.
The last advantage pointed out in this arbitration model is the
itizen’s ability to be present at all the procedures of the case
respondents 1 and 8). This reason is consistent with Bovaird
nd Löffler’s (2013) assertion: co-production enables users to
mploy their assets and resources; in this particular case the
sers can voluntarily add data to the process, thereby involving
hem in it, which aids decision-making and the swiftness and
uality of the decision.
User participation is therefore the biggest asset and inno-
ation in the creation of this arbitration centre. This asset is
rovided by co-production, as it fosters closeness among all
arties regarding the case procedures (respondent 7):
“The biggest advantage is the proximity to citizens and
the possibility they have of directly following the case
through the judges-arbitrators they appoint or the arbitrators
appointed by the centre” (respondent 13).
e
i
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Another innovation is the selection of judges-arbitrators by
hose engaged in the dispute (respondent 1), and that users com-
it to accepting and following the decision that is handed down
respondent 11):
“User participation is via the judges-arbitrators contained in
a list that is pre-approved and made public. These are people
of recognized merit in judging on the issues submitted to the
arbitration court, so when users resort to arbitration to settle
disputes, they already accept the participation of any of these
judges-arbitrators in the arbitration proceedings, relying on
them to consider the issue and to make judgement on it”
(respondent 12).
It should be noted, however, that among the new cases only
n fourteen of them did the parties request the appointment of
he arbitrator, while in three hundred and five cases there was
o request for the arbitrator, who was chosen from among the
ndependent experts.
User participation is not limited to monitoring the process.
he creation of this arbitration centre was based on the visibility
nd reputation of decisions (respondent 9), and these decisions
re highly dependent on what is offered by the users them-
elves. In designing the model, the parties involved can submit
roposals for improving services to the centre’s Ethics Council
respondent 6). Besides:
“(.  . .) I think that the participation of users – or, I would
say, of the organizations that represent them, rather than of
individual users – could be placed precisely at the ‘design’
and ‘implementation’, and then at the ‘monitoring’ stages.
The existence of something like a follow-up council con-
sisting of representatives from the organizations of persons
and entities that most often request the Centre’s interven-
tion, as well as the administration sectors who accede to
it, could be a ‘monitoring’ structure capable of assessing
the operation of the Centre and, depending on their expe-
rience, suggest and propose the appropriate adjustments”
(respondent 16).
Such a provision is consistent with what is argued by Eijk and
teen (2014), for whom co-production refers to actions where
itizens assist public agencies as volunteers in order to improve
he quality of the services provided – which actually happens in
his case because users participate in the co-production (not in
 narrow sense) of the services that they will use (Pestoff et al.,
006).
Some respondents (4, 11 and 12) maintain that, in order for
ervice users to go on benefitting from this service, it is nec-
ssary to ensure there is a legal and material framework that
s perfectly clear and appropriate. With the existence of this
ramework, they also argue that it is important to separate and
ontrol functions (respondent 3), and that each process can be
dapted to the case being tried (respondent 5). This would guar-
ntee the centre’s integrity, reputation, credibility, efficiency and
ffectiveness (respondents 9 and 13). In conclusion, the admin-
strative arbitration centre emerges as an innovative model, not
nly due to the services it provides but mainly as a result
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f the procedural and administrative participation of service
sers. This characteristic sets it apart from arbitration courts,
o that:
“(.  . .) the quality of the services provided – the speed and
correctness of the decisions – is an essential factor that the
CAAD has practised, in contrast to the very poor service
provided by the fiscal courts” (respondent 15).
onclusions
Given the scarcer resources that States have their disposal
o provide services that are fast, efficient, high-quality, and that
eet the necessary requirements of its users, co-production has
merged as an alternative means of catering to the collective
eeds that are individually experienced by populations. The co-
roduction is understood as comprising all actions in which
itizens (individually or collectively considered) assist public
gencies on a voluntary basis in order to improve the quality of
ublic services (Eijk & Steen, 2014).
In addition to the limitations of traditional models of service
rovision, due to citizens’ needs and to favourable political
nd institutional conditions, this way of providing public ser-
ices inspired, in Portugal, the creation of the Administrative
rbitration Centre in 2009, so as to settle disputes between
he administrative and fiscal public authority and its users. The
AAD is private in nature and, by engaging the various parties,
as increasingly gained prominence in conflict resolution – the
umber of cases submitted to it rose by over one thousand per-
ent between 2011 and 2014. This is explained by its swiftness in
ecision-making, which would not be possible otherwise (Hilton
 Hughes, 2013). In addition to the speed of decisions, there are
ther advantages such as the ongoing engagement of the service
ser through the appointment of the judges-arbitrators, the pro-
edural monitoring and also the ability to improve the entire
ervice by consulting users’.
However, there are two factors that should be considered.
he first refers to the issue of cost, i.e., the cost for users of
he administrative centre should be lower. This is reflected in
ot very positive evaluations by users. As borne out by judges-
rbitrators, cost is a barrier for individuals or organizations who
ould like to resort to this means of resolving existing dis-
utes. This is because the amounts charged to users are higher
han those of traditional means of conflict resolution. In spite
f the greater efficiency and effectiveness of their service provi-
ion, arbitration centres do not receive entirely positive feedback
rom users, as demonstrated by the study conducted by the
irectorate-General (2013). Therefore one of the challenges
hat should be taken into account is a reduction in the operating
osts of this model, to enable citizens to use its services more
ften.
This case shows that the State has no monopoly in the provi-
ion of public services and that it is possible to find more agile
ays of providing them by using co-production. Instead, citizens
nd society in general can themselves provide such services, thus
enefiting from goods and services they really need and that
elp them to resolve everyday issues they may face. It should be
Einistração 51 (2016) 355–365
oted that this is a preliminary and exploratory study, so ongo-
ng attention should be paid to this particular phenomenon. This
ttention is due because we cannot yet clearly assert Joshi and
oore (2004)’s argument that co-production ‘is the best of all
ossible alternatives’ to improve the provision of public ser-
ices through users’ participation in the design, implementation
nd evaluation of public policies. Moreover, it is important to
roceed with this analysis but this time focussing on the the-
ry of services proposed by Osborne (2013), thus cementing
heoretical knowledge in this field. This knowledge should also
e expanded to other industries and other social, political and
conomic realities.
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